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Abstract
Many previous methods generate adversarial ex-
amples based on the fast gradient sign attack se-
ries. However, these methods cannot balance the
indistinguishability and transferability due to the
limitations of the basic sign structure. To address
this problem, we propose an ADAM iterative fast
gradient tanh method (AI-FGTM) to generate in-
distinguishable adversarial examples with high
transferability. Extensive experiments on the Im-
ageNet dataset show that our method generates
more indistinguishable adversarial examples and
achieves higher black-box attack success rates
without extra running time and resource. Our
best attack, TI-DI-AITM, can fool six black-box
defense models with an average success rate of
88.0%. We expect that our method will serve as
a new baseline for generating adversarial exam-
ples with more transferability and indistinguisha-
bility.
1. Introduction
Despite the great success on many tasks, deep neural
networks (DNNs) have been shown that they are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Szegedy et al., 2014), i.e., inputs with imperceptible per-
turbations can cause the DNNs to output incorrect re-
sults. Furthermore, a tougher problem is the transfer-
ability (Liu et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017),
i.e., adversarial examples crafted by a known DNN
can also fool other black-box DNNs. Adversarial ex-
amples present severe threats to real-world applications
(Athalye et al., 2018; Eykholt et al., 2018; Kurakin et al.,
2017a) and have motivated extensive research on defense
methods (Madry et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Guo et al.,
2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018;
*Equal contribution, order determined by coin flip.
Pang et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018). Foolbox
(Rauber et al., 2017) roughly categorized attack methods
into three types: the gradient-based methods (Dong et al.,
2018; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017b), the
score-based methods (Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan,
2016) and the decision-based methods (Brendel et al.,
2018; Chen and Jordan, 2019). In this paper, we focus on
the gradient-based methods. Although adversarial exam-
ples crafted using the gradient-based methods satisfy the
Lp bound and continually achieve higher black-box success
rates, these examples can be identified easily. Many exist-
ing gradient-based methods generate adversarial examples
based on the basic sign structure, while the limitations of
this structure restrict the performance of adversarial exam-
ples. Taking TI-MI-FGSM (the combination of translation-
invariant method (Dong et al., 2019) and momentum itera-
tive fast gradient sign method (Dong et al., 2018)) as an ex-
ample, the gradient processing steps, such as Gaussian blur,
the gradient normalization and the sign function, greatly
ruin the gradient information. Additionally, the sign func-
tion increased the perturbation size due to its characteris-
tics.
In this paper, we propose an ADAM iterative fast gradi-
ent tanh method (AI-FGTM), which can improve the in-
distinguishability and the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. It is known that sign attack series iteratively pro-
cess gradient information with transformation, normaliza-
tion and the sign function. To preserve the gradient infor-
mation as much as possible, AI-FGTM modifies the ma-
jority gradient processing steps. Still take TI-MI-FGSM as
an example, to avoid the loss of gradient information and
generate imperceptible perturbations, we employ smaller
filter in Gaussian blur, then replace the momentum algo-
rithm and the sign function with ADAM (Kingma and Ba,
2015) and the tanh function, respectively. The overview
of our proposed AI-FGTM is shown in Fig. 1, and will be
stated more precisely in Sec. 3. Furthermore, combining
the existing attack methods with AI-FGTM can get much
smaller perturbations and deliver state-of-the-art success
rates. Fig. 2 shows the comparison of different examples,
which are clean examples and adversarial examples crafted
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by three combined attacks, DIM (Xie et al., 2019), TI-DIM
(Dong et al., 2019) and TI-DI-AITM (the combination of
TI-DIM and our method). Additionally, TI-DIM is the cur-
rent strongest black-box attack.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. Inspired by the limitations of sign attack series, we in-
troduce the ADAM iterative fast gradient tanh method
(AI-FGTM), in which we modify the majority gradi-
ent processing steps to boost the indistinguishability
and transferability of the adversarial examples.
2. We show that AI-FGTM integrated with other attacks
can get much smaller perturbations but larger loss than
current sign attack series.
3. The empirical experiments show that without extra
running time and resource, our best attack fools six
black-box defense models with an 88.0% success rate
on average, which is higher than the state-of-the-art
gradient-based attacks.
4. We expect that our work can serve as a new baseline
for generating adversarial examples with high trans-
ferability and indistinguishability.
2. Review of Existing Attack Methods
2.1. Problem definition
Let
{
(fKi)i∈[N ], (fUj)j∈[M ]
}
be a set of pre-trained clas-
sifiers, where (fKi)i∈[N ] denotes the white-box classifiers
and (fUj)j∈[M ] denotes the black-box classifiers. Given
a clean example x, it can be correctly classified to the
ground-truth label ytrue by all pre-trained classifiers. It is
possible to craft an adversarial example xadv that satisfy∥∥xadv − x∥∥
p
≤ ε by using the white-box classifiers, where
p could be 0, 1, 2, ∞, and ε is the perturbation size. In
this paper, we focus on non-targeted attack with p = ∞.
In non-targeted attack, the adversarial example xadv can
mislead both the white-box classifiers and the black-box
classifiers.
2.2. The gradient-based methods
Here, we introduce the family of the gradient-based meth-
ods.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) establishes the basic framework of the gradient-
based methods. It can efficiently craft an adversarial exam-
ple xadv by performing one-step update while maximizing
the loss function J
(
xadv, ytrue
)
of a given classifier as
xadv = x+ ε · sign (∇xJ (x, ytrue)) , (1)
where∇xJ (·, ·) computes the gradient of the loss function
w.r.t. x, sign (·) is the sign function, and ε is the given
scalar value that basically restricts the L∞ norm of the per-
turbation.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2017a) is
the iterative version of FGSM. It iteratively updates the ad-
versarial example xadvt with a small step size α as
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign
(
∇xadv
t
J
(
xadvt , y
true
))
, (2)
where α = ε/T with T denoting the number of iterations.
Another way to restrict xadvt within the ε-ball of x is clip-
ping xadvt after every update. Compared with FGSM, BIM
performs better in white-box attack but less effective in
black-box attack.
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method (MI-FGSM) (Dong et al., 2018) enhances the
transferability of adversarial examples by incorporating
momentum term into gradient process as
gt+1 = µ · gt +
∇xadv
t
J
(
x
adv
t , y
true
)
∥∥∥∇xadv
t
J
(
x
adv
t , y
true
)∥∥∥
1
, (3)
x
adv
t+1 = x
adv
t + αsign (gt+1), (4)
where gt+1 denotes the accumulated gradient at iteration
t+ 1, and µ is the decay factor of gt+1.
Nesterov Iterative Method (NIM) (Lin et al., 2019) inte-
grates an anticipatory update into MI-FGSM and improves
the transferability of adversarial examples. The update pro-
cedure is expressed as
xnest = x
adv
t + α · µ · gt, (5)
gt+1 = µ · gt +
∇xnes
t
J (xnest , y
true)∥∥∇xnes
t
J (xnest , y
true)
∥∥
1
, (6)
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + α · sign (gt+1). (7)
Scale-Invariant Method (SIM) (Lin et al., 2019) applies
the scale copies of the input image to further improve the
transferability. However, SIM requires much more running
time and resource.
Diverse Input Method (DIM) (Xie et al., 2019) applies
random resizing and padding to the adversarial examples
with probability p at each iteration. DIM can be easily in-
tegrated into other gradient-based methods to further boost
the transferability of adversarial examples.
Translation-InvariantMethod (TIM) (Dong et al., 2019)
optimizes a perturbation by an ensemble of translated ex-
amples, and further implements this ensemble by convolv-
ing the gradient with a pre-defined Gaussian filter. With
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Figure 1. Overview of the our method. (a) We use a smaller kernel in Gaussian blur to avoid the loss of the gradient information. (b) We
use ADAM (Kingma and Ba, 2015) instead of momentum method and gradient normalization to get larger loss in only ten iterations. (c)
We replace the sign function with the tanh function to generate smaller perturbations. (d) We gradually increase the step size.
limited running time and computing resources, the combi-
nation of TIM and DIM (TI-DIM) is the strongest black-
box attack method so far.
3. Methodology
3.1. Motivations
Although adversarial examples crafted using the gradient-
based methods satisfy the Lp bound and continually
achieve higher black-box success rates. However, these ad-
versarial examples can be identified easily. Based on this
contradiction, our observations and intuitions are shown as
follow:
1. The sign function in gradient-based methods has two
disadvantages. One is that the sign function normal-
izes all the gradient values to 1, -1 or 0, and thus
leads to the loss of gradient information. The other
is that the sign function normalizes some small gradi-
ent values to 1, -1, and thus increases the perturbation
size. The tanh function can normalize the large gradi-
ent values as the sign function but maintain the small
gradient values as function y = x. Hence, the tanh
function can replace the sign function and reduce the
perturbation size.
2. With iterations T = 10, the applications of Nesterov
accelerated gradient (NAG) (Lin et al., 2019) and the
momentum algorithm (Dong et al., 2018) in adver-
sarial attacks demonstrate that we can migrate other
methods to generate adversarial examples. Further-
more, the tth gradient ∇xadv
t
J
(
xadvt , y
true
)
is nor-
malized by the L1 distance of itself before the mo-
mentum algorithm. Intuitively, due to the performance
of traditional convergence algorithms, ADAM can
achieve larger loss than the momentum algorithm in
such small number of iterations. Additionally, ADAM
can normalize the gradient with mt
/√
vt + δ, where
mt denotes the first moment vector, vt denotes the sec-
ond moment vector and δ = 10−8.
3. Traditional convergence algorithms apply learning
rate decay to improve the model performance. Ex-
isting gradient-based methods set stable step size α =
ε/T . In intuition, we can improve the transferabil-
ity with the step size change. Different from the tra-
ditional convergence algorithms, the attack methods
with the ε-ball restriction aim to maximize the loss
function of the target models. Hence, we use the in-
creasing step size with
∑T−1
t=0 αt = ε.
4. Dong et al. (Dong et al., 2019) show that Gaussian
blur with large kernel improves the transferability of
adversarial examples. However, Gaussian blur with
larger kernel leads to the loss of the gradient informa-
tion. Using the modifications mentioned above, the
gradient information is preserved and plays a more
important role in generating adversarial examples.
Hence, We apply a smaller kernel in Gaussian blur to
avoid the loss of the gradient information.
Based on the above four observations, we propose an
ADAM iterative fast gradient tanh method (AI-FGTM) to
craft adversarial examples, which are expected to be more
transferable and imperceptible.
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Figure 2. The comparison of clean examples and adversarial examples crafted by three combined attacks. (1) TI-DI-AITM (λ=0.65)
achieves similar success rates as TI-DIM and generates much more indistinguishable adversarial examples. (2) TI-DI-AITM (λ=1.3)
achieves much higher success rates than TI-DIM and generates more indistinguishable adversarial examples.
3.2. ADAM iterative fast gradient tanh method
ADAM (Kingma and Ba, 2015) uses the exponential mov-
ing averages of squared past gradients to mitigate the rapid
decay of the learning rate. Essentially, this algorithm limits
the reliance of the update to only the past few gradients by
the following simple recursion:
mt+1 = β1mt + (1− β1) gt+1
and vt+1 = β2vt + (1− β2) g2t+1
, (8)
θt+1 = θt − α ·
√
(1− βt2)
1− βt1
· mt+1√
vt+1 + δ
, (9)
where mt denotes the first moment vector, vt denotes the
secondmoment vector, β1 and β2 denote exponential decay
rates.
Due to the opposite optimization objectives, we adapt
ADAM into adversarial attack with some modifications.
Start with xadv0 = x, mt = 0 and vt = 0, the first moment
estimate and the second moment estimate are presented as
follows:
mt+1 = mt + µ1 · ∇xadv
t
J
(
xadvt , y
true
)
, (10)
vt+1 = vt + µ2 ·
(
∇xadv
t
J
(
xadvt , y
true
))2
, (11)
where µ1 and µ2 respectively denote the first moment fac-
tor and second moment factor. We replace the sign function
with the tanh function and update xadvt+1 as
αt =
ε∑T−1
t=0
1−βt+1
1√
(1−βt+12 )
1− βt+11√(
1− βt+12
) , (12)
xadvt+1 = x
adv
t + αt · tanh
(
λ
mt+1√
vt+1 + δ
)
, (13)
where β1 and β2 are exponential decay rates, and λ denotes
the scale factor. Specifically, αt is the increasing step size
with
∑T−1
t=0 αt = ε. Then the tanh function reduces the
perturbations of adversarial examples without any success
rate reduction. Furthermore,mt+1/
(√
vt+1 + δ
)
replaces
the L1 normalization and the first moment estimate due to
the fact that ADAM has faster divergence speed than mo-
mentum attack algorithm (as shown in the middle column
of Fig. 1).
4. Experiments
In this section, we provide extensive experimental results
on ImageNet dataset to validate our method. We first intro-
duce the experimental setting in Sec. 4.1. Then we investi-
gate the effects of different hyper-parameters of AI-FGTM
in Sec. 4.2 and compare the running efficiency of different
attacks in Sec. 4.3. We finally compare the results of the
baseline attacks in Sec. 4.4 and Sec. 4.5. Table 1 presents
the definitions of the abbreviations used in the paper.
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Table 1. Abbreviations used in the paper
Abbreviation Definition
DIM The combination of MI-FGSM and DIM
NI-DIM The combination of MI-FGSM, NIM and DIM
SI-NI-DIM The combination of MI-FGSM, NIM, SIM and DIM
DI-AITM The combination of AI-FGTM and DIM
TI-DIM The combination of MI-FGSM, TIM and DIM
NI-TI-DIM The combination of MI-FGSM, NIM, TIM and DIM
SI-NI-TI-DIM The combination of MI-FGSM, NIM, SIM, TIM and DIM
TI-DI-AITM The combination of AI-FGTM, TIM and DIM
Figure 3. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-101, Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4 and In-
cResv2ens.
4.1. Experimental setting
Dataset. We utilize 1000 images 1 which are used in the
NIPS 2017 adversarial competition to conduct the follow-
ing experiments.
Models. In this paper, we employ 10 models to perform
the following experiments. Four non-defense models (In-
ception v3 (Inc-v3) (Szegedy et al., 2016), Inception v4
(Inc-v4), Inception ResNet v2 (IncRes-v2) (Szegedy et al.,
2017), and ResNet v2-101 (Res-v2-101) (He et al., 2016))
are used as white-boxmodels to craft adversarial examples.
The other six defense models (Inc-v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4, In-
cResv2ens (Trame`r et al., 2018), high-level representation
guided denoiser (HGD) (Liao et al., 2018), input trans-
formation through random resizing and padding (R&P)
(Xie et al., 2018), and rank-3 submission 2 in the NIPS
2017 adversarial competition) are employed as black-box
models to evaluate the crafted adversarial exampls.
1https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/tree/master/examples/nips17_adversarial_competition/dataset
2
https://github.com/anlthms/nips-2017/tree/master/mmd
Baselines. We focus on two groups of comparisons in
single-model attack. One group is the comparison of DIM,
NI-DIM and DI-AITM. The other group is the compar-
ison of TI-DIM, NI-TI-DIM and TI-DI-AITM. We only
consider TI-DIM, NI-TI-DIM and TI-DI-AITM in multi-
model attack due to the low success rates of DIM.
Hyper-parameters. According to TI-DIM (Dong et al.,
2019) and NI-FGSM (Lin et al., 2019), we set the maxi-
mum perturbation ε = 16, the number of iteration T = 10.
Specifically, we set the kernel size to 15 × 15 in normal
TI-DIM and NI-TI-DIM while 9 × 9 in TI-DI-AITM. For
our method, we explore the appropriate settings in Sec. 4.2
4.2. The effects of different hyper-parameters
We explore the effects of different hyper-parameters of AI-
FGTM and aim to find the appropriate settings to balance
the success rates of both white-box and black-box attacks.
The adversarial examples are generated for the ensemble
of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-101 using TI-
DI-AITM. We first show the results of white-box attacks
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Figure 4. Results of adversarial examples generated for the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-101 using different
attacks.
Table 2. The running time (s) of generating 1000 adversarial examples for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-101 and the ensemble of
theses four models.
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Res-v2-101 Model ensemble
DIM 155.0 242.1 281.2 234.1 805.8
NI-DIM 147.0 227.9 287.1 235.0 810.3
SI-NI-DIM 590.7 983.5 1171.1 938.7 3571.9
DI-AITM 149.2 234.9 281.4 239.1 854.4
TI-DIM 172.8 261.2 277.8 234.0 767.5
NI-TI-DIM 174.5 238.9 291.8 243.0 830.2
SI-NI-TI-DIM 608.2 1086.3 1156.2 1096.2 3490.2
TI-DI-AITM 170.6 258.5 280.4 239.3 762.7
against four known models, and then we present the per-
formance of black-box attacks against three defense mod-
els in Fig. 3. It can be seen that the appropriate settings are
λ = 1.3, µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 1.9, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99, kernel
length = 9.
Then we validate our method by comparing the different re-
sults betweenDIM, TI-DIM and TI-DI-AI-FGTM in Fig. 4.
Adversarial examples are generated for the ensemble of
Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2 and Res-v2-101 using different
attack methods. Fig. 4 (a) shows that the tanh function
does not hurt the performance of adversarial examples and
ADAM can boost the attack success rates. Fig. 4 (b) shows
that our method can significantly reduce the mean perturba-
tion size of adversarial examples. In particular, our method
can reduce 40% perturbation while delivering the stable
performance. Fig. 4 (c) shows that our approach can get
larger loss than DIM and TI-DIM.
4.3. The comparison of running efficiency
We compare the running time of each attack mentioned
in Table 1 using a piece of Nvidia GPU GTX 1080 Ti.
Table 2 shows the running time under single-model set-
ting and multi-model setting. It can be seen that attacks
combined with our method AI-FGTM do not cost extra
running. Additionally, SIM requires four pieces of GPUs
under multi-model setting and costs much more running
time than other attacks under both single-model setting and
multi-model setting. We therefore exclude SIM in the fol-
lowing experiments.
4.4. The validation results in the single-model attack
scenario
In this section, we compare the success rates of AI-FGTM
based attacks and the baseline attacks against six black-box
defense models. Using the hyper parameters determined in
Sec. 4.1, we generate adversarial attacks for Inc-v3, Incv4,
IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-101 respectively using DIM, NI-
DIM, DI-AITM, TI-DIM, NI-TI-DIM and TI-DI-AITM.
As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, we can find that our attack
method consistently outperform the baseline attacks by a
large margin. According to these two tables and Fig. 4(b),
we observe that our method can generate adversarial ex-
amples with much better transferability and indistinguisha-
bility. Experimental results also demonstrate that NIM is
ineffective in single-model attacks.
4.5. The validation results in the multi-model attack
scenario
In this section, we further present the success rates of ad-
versarial examples generated for an ensemble of four non-
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Table 3. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six defense models under single-model setting. The adversarial examples
are generated for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-101 respectively using DIM, NI-DIM and DI-AITM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P NIPS-r3
Inc-v3
DIM
NI-DIM
DI-AITM
24.1
23.2
33.1
24.5
23.1
33.3
13.0
12.4
16.7
9.7
9.1
16.7
13.2
12.4
17.0
18.5
17.1
19.9
Inc-v4
DIM
NI-DIM
DI-AITM
28.1
23.6
33.9
27.9
24.9
35.2
15.6
13.7
20.7
14.9
12.6
19.8
17.2
16.1
21.8
14.3
12.9
19.1
IncRes-v2
DIM
NI-DIM
DI-AITM
41.2
32.4
47.0
40.1
29.4
45.3
27.5
19.4
36.0
32.7
23.5
40.0
30.4
21.9
38.2
37.5
29.6
44.3
Res-v2-101
DIM
NI-DIM
DI-AITM
40.6
34.0
49.0
36.1
32.7
46.9
24.5
19.7
33.0
32.4
26.9
40.6
26.6
22.7
35.9
34.6
28.1
42.5
Table 4. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six black-box defense models under single-model setting. The adversarial
examples are generated for Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-101 respectively using TI-DIM, NI-TI-DIM and TI-DI-AITM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P NIPS-r3
Inc-v3
TI-DIM
NI-TI-DIM
TI-DI-AITM
46.5
48.3
53.8
47.3
48.6
53.3
38.1
36.9
39.0
38.0
37.3
40.2
36.9
36.8
39.1
41.1
42.5
45.7
Inc-v4
TI-DIM
NI-TI-DIM
TI-DI-AITM
48.2
52.4
53.2
47.9
51.8
51.8
39.1
41.3
42.4
40.6
41.9
43.7
39.3
41.1
42.5
41.5
42.7
44.6
IncRes-v2
TI-DIM
NI-TI-DIM
TI-DI-AITM
60.8
61.5
64.9
59.6
60.4
61.8
59.3
59.9
62.1
58.4
60.1
62.7
60.7
62.2
64.8
61.3
63.1
65.1
Res-v2-101
TI-DIM
NI-TI-DIM
TI-DI-AITM
56.1
59.5
62.8
55.4
57.7
62.8
49.8
50.4
54.4
51.3
51.9
55.3
50.4
50.8
54.2
52.3
54.6
57.1
defense models. Table 5 presents the results of black-box
attacks against six defense models. It shows that our meth-
ods can get higher success rates than baseline attacks. In
particular, without extra running time and resource, TI-DI-
AITM can fool six black-box defense models with an aver-
age success rate of 88.0%, which is higher than the state-
of-the-art gradient-based attacks.
As shown in Fig. 3, our method achieves nearly 100%
white-box attack success rates. In addition, as shown in
Fig. 4, our method can reduce nearly 20% mean pertur-
bation, inflate 13% mean loss and achieve state-of-the-art
mean success rate with λ = 1.3. Furthermore, our method
can reduce nearly 40% mean perturbation while achieving
similar mean loss and mean success rate compared with TI-
DIM when λ = 0.65.
From the above experimental results, it is reasonable to
state that the proposed TI-DI-AITM can generate adver-
sarial examples with much better indistinguishability and
transferability. Meanwhile, TI-DI-AITM raises a security
challenge for the development of more effective defense
models.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an ADAM iterative fast gradi-
ent tanh method (AI-FGTM) to craft adversarial examples
that are indistinguishable and transferable. AI-FGTMmod-
ifies the majority gradient processing steps of the basic sign
structure to address the limitations faced by the existing
basic sign involved methods. Compared with the state-
of-the-art attacks, extensive experiments on the ImageNet
dataset show that our method generates more indistinguish-
able adversarial examples and achieves higher black-box
attack success rates without extra running time and re-
source. Our best attack TI-DI-AITM can fool six black-
box defense models with an average success rate of 88.0%,
which is 4.3% higher than the state-of-the-art gradient-
based attacks. It is expected that our method serves as a
new baseline for generating adversarial examples with high
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Table 5. The success rates (%) of adversarial attacks against six black-box defense models under multi-model setting. The adversarial
examples are generated for the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-v2-101 using TI-DIM, NI-TI-DIM, TI-DI-AITM.
Attack Inc-v3ens3 Inc-v3ens4 IncRes-v2ens HGD R&P NIPS-r3 Average
TI-DIM 83.9 83.2 78.4 81.9 81.2 83.6 82.0
NI-TI-DIM 85.5 85.9 80.1 83.6 82.9 84.3 83.7
TI-DI-AITM 90.2 88.5 85.4 88.3 87.1 88.7 88.0
transferability and indistinguishability.
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